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Abstract
We study convergence properties of iterative voting pro-
cedures. Such procedures are defined by a voting rule
and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step
one agent can modify his vote towards a better outcome
for himself. It is already known that if the iteration dy-
namics (the manner in which voters are allowed to mod-
ify their votes) are unrestricted, then the voting process
may not converge. For most common voting rules this
may be observed even under the best response dynam-
ics limitation. It is therefore important to investigate
whether and which natural restrictions on the dynam-
ics of iterative voting procedures can guarantee con-
vergence. To this end, we provide two general condi-
tions on the dynamics based on iterative myopic im-
provements, each of which is sufficient for convergence.
We then identify several classes of voting rules (includ-
ing Positional Scoring Rules, Maximin, Copeland and
Bucklin), along with their corresponding iterative pro-
cesses, for which at least one of these conditions hold.
Introduction
Voting mechanisms constitute a popular tool for prefer-
ence aggregation and collective decision making in multi-
agent systems that involve entities with possibly diverse
preferences. The major concern, however, with voting as a
decision-making process, is that voters may misreport their
real preferences in order to favour certain candidates. In-
deed, strategic behaviour is inherent in most voting rules, as
the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973;
Satterthwaite 1975) asserts. It is then natural to resort to
game-theoretic concepts and tools in order to model voting
behaviour and assess the outcome of a voting process.
Motivated by web services such as Doodle or Survey
Monkey, we investigate strategic behaviour in iterative vot-
ing processes. Specifically, following (Meir et al. 2010), we
consider iterative procedures, where agents start from some
initial (most commonly, the truthful) voting configuration,
and subsequently make myopic improvements by changing
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their vote. Iterative voting has recently received significant
attention in the literature due to, in part, its potential to pro-
vide good predictions for the final outcome of a vote. For in-
stance, an iterative process eliminates low quality Nash equi-
libria that may arise otherwise, in a one-shot voting game.
Also, iterative voting can model the electorate response to
poll data, see e.g., (Reijngoud and Endriss 2012).
Several results have been obtained regarding the conver-
gence of best/better response dynamics for various voting
rules (see Related Work). One of the main findings is that
if agents are allowed to make arbitrary moves (or just play
only best responses), then convergence of such processes is
not guaranteed, see e.g., (Lev and Rosenschein 2012). Nev-
ertheless, it is often the case that voters will not choose a
best response when they update their voting decision. Natu-
ral restrictions may apply if the voters are computationally
bounded or if they tend to make greedy local moves. Voters
may also desire a consensus, reached by the smallest possi-
ble changes to their ballot, rather than a plain manipulation.
Some restrictions on the dynamics of voting processes, as an
attempt to model such considerations, were studied recently
by (Reijngoud and Endriss 2012) and (Grandi et al. 2013).
However, the family of restricted moves that enforces con-
vergence has not been yet characterised, and this is one of
the major open directions in the field of iterative voting.
Against this background, in this work we consider itera-
tive voting procedures, specified by a voting rule along with
a dynamic process, i.e., a specification of improvement steps
that can be made by the voters. We focus on single-winner
elections, with lexicographic tie-breaking. Our contribution
is twofold. On the conceptual level, we provide two general
conditions on these processes, each of which is sufficient for
convergence. The first one is based on potential function ar-
guments, whereas the second concerns the monotonicity of a
set sequence defined along an improvement path. These con-
ditions provide a unifying framework to study the behaviour
of such dynamics. We then utilise this framework to identify
dynamic processes that converge for several classes of vot-
ing rules (including Positional Scoring Rules, Maximin, and
Bucklin). Especially for Bucklin, this is essentially the first
positive result regarding convergence of an iterative voting
procedure. At the same time, we also generalise recent re-
sults and relax a number of restrictive assumptions made in
previous research. Finally, our conditions enable us to iden-
tify maximal sets of convergent dynamics (to an extent, as
explained in the later sections).
Related Work
Earlier work on iterative voting processes is well sum-
marised in (Laffont 1987), and concerns dynamics for de-
ciding on allocations of public goods. The study of iter-
ative voting in the more recent AI literature was initiated
by (Meir et al. 2010), who focused on improvement dynam-
ics under the Plurality rule, and provided both positive and
negative results, depending on the initial voting profile, the
tie-breaking rule and the improvement steps allowed (bet-
ter replies or best responses). The follow up work (Lev and
Rosenschein 2012) showed that for other voting rules, in
fact, for most popular ones, it is often the case that conver-
gence of best responses cannot be guaranteed. More results
along this direction were established in (Reyhani and Wil-
son 2012), who also improved on the convergence bounds
of (Meir et al. 2010). In the same spirit, (Kukushkin 2011)
studied the existence of potential functions in voting games,
as a way to prove convergence, and showed that the only
voting rule admitting a potential function is the dictatorial
rule. An analysis in terms of the quality of equilibria reach-
able by such processes was given in (Branzei et al. 2013).
Finally, some different types of voting processes have been
studied in (Airiau and Endriss 2009), where each agent is
allowed to propose a change in the current state and then a
vote is held for its acceptance, and more recently in (Meir,
Lev, and Rosenschein 2014), where voters may have uncer-
tainty about the current state and best responses are defined
in terms of local dominance.
The works most closely related to ours are those of (Rei-
jngoud and Endriss 2012) and (Grandi et al. 2013). Both of
these consider procedures where voters may not play a best
response but instead move according to certain restricted
dynamics. Three types of processes have been considered
(defined in the next section), and convergence results were
established for some families of voting rules. As we show
in the following sections, our framework incorporates these
positive results and relaxes some of the limitations on the
allowed moves. In particular, it demonstrates that our pro-
posed restrictions on voting dynamics are weaker. As a re-
sult, a greater variability in voting behaviours can be al-
lowed, while maintaining the stability of the iterative pro-
cess, i.e., preserving convergence properties.
Finally, there have been other works applying game-
theoretic concepts and tools to voting, starting with (Far-
quharson 1969). More recent research along this line has fo-
cused either on studying stronger equilibrium concepts (Ser-
tel and Sanver 2004) or on different models of voting
behaviour such as voting with abstentions (Desmedt and
Elkind 2010) or truth-biased voting (Meir et al. 2010;
Thompson et al. 2013; Dutta and Laslier 2010; Obraztsova
et al. 2013). Here we concentrate on the standard voting be-
haviour model, and do not consider these latter extensions.
Preliminaries
We first recall some of the most common voting rules, and
define the setting of iterative voting based on myopic im-
provement moves by single voters.
Voting rules
There is a set V = {1, . . . , n} of n voters (or agents) elect-
ing a winner from a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of m candidates
(or alternatives). Let L(C) be the set of all strict linear or-
ders onC. Each voter i submits a vote (or ballot) bi ∈ L(C),
which may or may not coincide with his real preference or-
der, i∈ L(C). A profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ L(C)n is
a vector of votes, one for each agent. We denote by b−i
the profile of all votes except that of agent i, so that b =
(bi,b−i). A voting rule F : L(C)n → 2C takes a voting
profile as input, and produces an outcome—a nonempty sub-
set of candidates, called the winners of the election. In this
paper, we focus on resolute voting rules F : L(C)n → C,
which always return a single winner. Specifically, we assume
ties are broken according to lexicographic tie-breaking—
i.e., in favour of the candidate with the lowest index.
Examples of common voting rules include:
• Positional scoring rules (PSRs). Each such rule is asso-
ciated with a scoring vector (s1, ..., sm) where s1 > sm
and s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. If a voter ranks a candidate
at the j-th position, the candidate receives a score of sj
from this vote. The total score of a candidate is the sum of
scores over all the votes, and the winner of the election is
the candidate with the highest score. This family of rules
includes Plurality with the scoring vector (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
Veto with (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0), Borda with (m−1,m−2, ..., 0)
and k-approval with (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0), i.e., k 1’s, followed
by 0’s.
• Maximin. Under this rule, the score of a candidate c is
the minimum number of voters who prefer c over all pair-
wise comparisons with the other candidates. The candi-
date with the highest such score wins the election.
• Copeland. The score of a candidate c is the number of
pairwise comparisons he wins (i.e., the number of other
candidates c′, for which the majority of voters prefers c to
c′), minus the number of pairwise comparisons he loses.
The winner has the highest such score.
• Bucklin. In one of its versions, this rule first identifies for
each candidate c, the minimum number k for which the
majority of voters rank c within their top k choices. Let
kmin be the minimum such number over all candidates.
The election then proceeds as a kmin-approval election.
Under the rules defined above, each candidate can be nat-
urally associated with a score, derived from a given voting
profile. For rules where there is no obvious way to score the
candidates, we can define an artificial score where the win-
ner under a given profile receives 1 point, and other candi-
dates receive 0 points. Thus, w.l.o.g. we can assume that any
voting rule corresponds to a scoring algorithm with the prop-
erty that the candidate with the highest score wins the elec-
tion (after possibly applying a tie-breaking rule as well). We
may also assume that the scores are integer numbers. Note
that there can be several scoring rules corresponding to a
voting rule; in what follows, whenever we are given a voting
rule, we will also assume that it is accompanied by a fixed
scoring rule (the natural one when it comes to the voting
rules that are defined above). For each candidate c ∈ C, his
score at profile b under voting rule F is denoted by sF (c,b)
(we drop the indices when clear from the context).
Iterative voting
Each voting rule F induces a natural game form, where the
strategies available to each voter are given by L(C), and the
outcome of a joint action (i.e., a voting profile) b is wb =
F(b). Voter i prefers profile b′ over profile b if wb′ i wb,
and we say that bi
i→ b′i is an improvement move (or a better
reply) of agent i w.r.t. b, if he prefers (b′i,b−i) over b.
A path is a sequence (b0 → b1 → · · · ) of voting pro-
files such that for every k ≥ 1, there exists a unique agent,
say voter i, for which bk = (b′i,b
k−1
−i ) for some b
′
i 6= bk−1i
in L(C). It is an improvement path if for all k ≥ 1, the
move made by the unique deviator at step k, is an improve-
ment move. The setting of iterative voting is based on my-
opic improvement dynamics as above: the voters start by
announcing some initial vote, and then proceed and change
their votes in turns, one at a time, up until no one has an ob-
jection to the current outcome. As often in previous works,
we make a natural assumption that the initial profile is the
truthful one—that is, b0 = (1, . . . ,n). We do not make
any restrictions on the order in which the agents apply their
improvement moves.
Convergence of better replies is not guaranteed though,
even for games induced by the simple Plurality rule. Hence
the natural restriction of best response dynamics is usually
made: the deviating voter is assumed to make the best pos-
sible move at each step. While best responses always con-
verge for Plurality and Veto with linear tie-breaking (Meir
et al. 2010; Lev and Rosenschein 2012), they may cy-
cle under other rules, such as Copeland (Grandi et al.
2013), Borda, and k-approval (Lev and Rosenschein 2012;
Reyhani and Wilson 2012).
Restricted dynamics
In such settings, convergence can be achieved by restricting
the sets of available improvement moves even further. Such
restrictions may potentially arise due to uncertainty or limi-
tations of the voters’ computational power. To this end, the
following dynamics have been previously considered:
• Second Chance (SC)1 (Grandi et al. 2013): If the current
winner is not the deviator’s best or second-best choice, he
moves his second-best alternative to the top position;
• k-pragmatist (Brams and Fishburn 1983; Reijngoud and
Endriss 2012): The deviator moves his favourite among
the k currently highest ranked alternatives to the top posi-
tion, without changing the relative ranking of the others;
• Best Upgrade (BU)1 (Grandi et al. 2013): The deviator
moves to the top position his favourite alternative among
1Also referred to as M1 and M2 in (Grandi et al. 2013).
those who can win the election and are currently ranked
in the deviator’s ballot above the current winner.
In later sections, we extend some of the above policies and
propose alternative voting dynamics. We use the term itera-
tive voting procedure (F , D) to define the process based on
the improvement dynamics D under the voting rule F . In
this work, we focus on dynamics where the deviator always
chooses his best possible action among the allowed ones. We
say that a voting procedure converges if every improvement
path that contains moves allowed by D is finite under F .
Two sufficient conditions for convergence
We present two conditions on iterative voting procedures,
each of which guarantees convergence. These conditions are
powerful enough to incorporate all convergence results for
restricted dynamics in the literature. Moreover, they provide
a general framework that lets us identify maximal ranges of
converging processes, as we exemplify further.
Function monotonicity
The first condition is based on the potential argument (Mon-
derer and Shapley 1996). That is, we define a real-valued
function G : L(C)n → R over the set of voting profiles,
and require that it increases along any allowed improvement
path. In fact, weak monotonicity of G(·) will suffice.
Condition 1 (Function monotonicity (FM)). Given an iter-
ative voting procedure (F , D) and a profile b, let
G(b) = sF (wb,b) +
m− index(wb)
m+ 1
, (1)
where for any candidate c, index(c) indicates his position
in the tie-breaking order. Then, for any improvement path
(b0 → b1 → · · · ), we have G(bk) ≥ G(bk−1), ∀k ≥ 1.
A weaker variant of this condition has also appeared
in (Loreggia 2012). As Theorem 1 below states, Condition 1
guarantees convergence for voting procedures that admit
consistent scoring functions, sF , satisfying FM.
Theorem 1. Any iterative voting procedure (F , D) that sat-
isfies FM, converges in at most (m + 1)(smaxF + 1) steps,
where smaxF is the maximal attainable score under F .
Set monotonicity
The second condition follows the idea of (Reyhani and Wil-
son 2012). In their work, convergence of best response dy-
namics for Plurality was (re)proved by showing inclusion
monotonicity for the sets of potential winners along an im-
provement path. These are the sets of candidates for which
there exists a voter that can make them win the election by
unilaterally applying an improvement move at a given step.
The condition we give below is stronger and requires mono-
tone inclusion of individual sets of potentially winning can-
didates for each voter separately. Moreover, our definition is
recursive so that a current winner of the election belongs to
the set of potential winners of a voter i, only if it has or could
have become a winner due to voter i’s move.
In what follows, we slightly abuse the notation and write
wk = wbk and sk(·) = sF (·,bk) for a profile bk, at step k
of a path (b0 → b1 → · · · ), under a given (F , D).
Definition 1. Let (F , D) be an iterative voting procedure.
For i ∈ V and an improvement path (b0 → b1 → · · · ), let
PWi(b
0
) = {w0}
⋃{
c ∈ C ∣∣ ∃b′i : c = F (b′i,b0−i) ∧ c i w0}
where b
′
i above is consistent with D. For k ≥ 1, let
PWi(b
k
) =
{
c ∈ C ∣∣ ∃b′i : c = F (b′i,bk−i) ∧ c i wk}
⋃ { {wk}, if wk ∈ PWi(bk−1)
∅, otherwise
Condition 2 (Set monotonicity (SM)). Let (F , D) be an it-
erative voting procedure. Then, for any improvement path
(b0 → b1 → · · · ) in (F , D), we have, PWi(bk) ⊆
PWi(b
k−1), ∀i ∈ V, k ≥ 1, and at least one of the fol-
lowing holds:
(a) at each step k, there exists an agent i ∈ V for whom the
inclusion is strict;
(b) there is a finite number q,2 so that for every i ∈ V and c ∈
C, the maximum possible number of consecutive moves
that can be made by i in favour of c, is bounded by q.3
Theorem 2. Any iterative voting procedure (F , D) that sat-
isfies SM, converges in at most qmn steps.
Non-equivalence between FM and SM
Next, we observe that the function and the set monotonicity
conditions do not imply each other. We start with Example 1
of a voting procedure where FM does not hold, but SM does.
Example 1. There are 9 voters and m candidates for some
large enough m. Figure 1 shows the truthful preference pro-
file, where all the missing candidates within the first 4 po-
sitions of each voter are distinct dummy candidates, differ-
ent from c1 and c2. In particular, c1 appears at position 5 or
lower for voters 1, 4 and 5. Ditto for c2 and voters 6–9.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
c2 c2 c2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c1
. . . c1 c1 c2 . . . . . . . . . c1 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . c2 c1 c1 . . . . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 1: Voters’ preferences in a game with SM but not FM
The voting rule we use is Bucklin, and the iterative im-
provement policy restricts voters to perform single swaps,
where one candidate is moved one position up in the cur-
rent ranking, if this candidate can become a new winner af-
ter such a move. Hence, at each step, the deviator moves his
favourite alternative among the potential winners, by exactly
one position up, and keeps the relative ranking of the others
unchanged. We will revisit these dynamics in a later section,
2Usually, a simple function of m or n. For instance, as we will
show, q = m− 1 for many positional scoring rules.
3We refer to moves that are consecutive in the sub-sequence of
moves made by voter i only. They need not be consecutive in the
whole improvement path.
where we will establish positive results for Bucklin and a
special class of PSRs.
Under the truthful profile b0, the winner is c1, with a score
of 6 (the Bucklin winning round, kmin, is 4). Consider now
the following sequence (b0 → b1 → b2 → b3 → b4) of
updates under the dynamics specified: first, voter 5 moves
c2 upwards by one position, making c2 the new winner in
b1. Then, voter 6 changes his vote and ranks c1 in the 3rd
position, making c1 the winner in b2. Voter 5 responds by
ranking c2 in the 2nd position. Finally, voter 6 again lifts c1
by one position. One can check that no voter can change his
vote in b4 to make c2 or any other candidate a winner.
To see that condition FM is violated, note that in the truth-
ful profile, the score of c1 is 6, and observe that in b1, the
winner’s score decreases to 5, implying G(b1) < G(b0).
We show now that condition SM holds, in particular
SM(b) holds. First, look at the sets of potential winners for
voters 5 and 6, who are involved in the improvement path.
For 5, we have PW5(b0) = {c1, c2} and PW5(b1) =
{c2}. Then this set remains unchanged until eventually we
get PW5(b4) = ∅. For voter 6, his initial set, which is
PW6(b
0) = {c1}, remains unchanged until the last step.
Now, agent 7 has the same preference order as voter 6 but
does not make a move. He has PW7(b0) = PW7(b1) =
PW7(b
2) = {c1}, and then PW7(b3) = ∅, which remains
further unchanged. Similarly, we check the monotonicity of
these sets for the rest of the voters. Finally, it is trivial that the
number of possible consecutive moves of a voter in favour of
a certain candidate is at mostm−1, hence SM(b) holds.
Remark 1. The game in Example 1 satisfies SM(b), but not
SM(a). One can make slight adjustments, so that condition
FM still does not hold but SM(a) does. We omit the details.
Next, we give an example where FM holds but neither ver-
sion of Condition 2 does.
Example 2. The construction is based on the (Borda, BU)
procedure. We construct an instance where voter 1 has the
preference order c1 1 c2 1 c3 1 . . ., and the ranking of
voter 2 is c1 2 c3 2 c4 2 . . . 2 c2. The preferences of
the other voters are such that in the full truthful profile, b0,
the following conditions hold:
• candidate c3 is the winner (we denote his score by s);
• candidate c2 has s− 1 points in b0;
• candidates c4, c5, . . . , cm have s points in b0 (but they all
lose due to tie-breaking);
• candidate c1 has less than s− 1 points.
We first exhibit that SM does not hold. Under BU, voter 1
can swap the positions of c1 and c2, resulting in candidate c2
having a score of s and winning the election by tie-breaking.
Let b1 be this new profile, and consider voter 2. At b0, he
had PW2(b0) = {c2, c3}. But then at b1 the current winner
is the last choice of voter 2, hence under BU there are many
candidates that he can turn into a winner. Thus, PW2(b1) =
{c2, c3, ..., cm}, hence SM is violated.
Finally, FM holds by the results of (Grandi et al. 2013),
falling under the first case of Proposition 3 below.
Known procedures and relaxations
We now turn to explore the power of these monotonicity
conditions. We start by showing that they capture the con-
vergence results for previously studied restricted dynam-
ics (Reijngoud and Endriss 2012; Grandi et al. 2013).
Proposition 3. The function monotonicity holds for the fol-
lowing iterative voting procedures: (i) k-pragmatist under
PSRs; (ii) SC and BU under PSRs, Copeland or Maximin.
Furthermore, SC also satisfies SM.
In fact SC converges under any voting rule. Proposition 3,
in particular, demonstrates that the BU dynamic satisfies FM
for most common voting rules. However, the FM condition
is far more general. To see this, we next observe that BU can
be significantly relaxed (i.e., allow a greater range of voter
behaviours) within the FM bounds, thus preserving the con-
vergence of the iterative voting process. In particular, con-
sider the following relaxations:
• BU-1: As long as the winner changes to a more favourable
candidate, the deviating voter can freely shuffle among
themselves all the candidates ranked above c. The same
applies to all the candidates ranked below c (again, among
themselves). He is not allowed to change the ranking of c.
• BU-2: As before, the deviating voter is restricted to keep
the rank of c unchanged, but can now shuffle the remain-
ing candidates absolutely freely to effect the win by some
of his more favourable candidates.
Theorem 4. Both BU-1 and BU-2 satisfy FM under PSRs.
Also, BU-1 satisfies FM under Copeland and Maximin.
(Maximal) monotone dynamics under PSRs,
Maximin and Bucklin
This section contains our main technical results. We iden-
tify several iterative voting procedures, for which either FM
or SM hold. Unlike our previous discussion on BU-1 and
BU-2, in what follows we will not a priori require that the
current winner keeps his absolute position in the deviator’s
ballot. Indeed, this restriction may be too stringent, and we
will seek more natural dynamics. However, as the proof
of Theorem 4 suggests, BU-1 and BU-2 are maximal for
Copeland/Maximin and PSRs, respectively, in the sense that
removing any of their restrictions would yield violation of
FM. Hence, to preserve monotonicity, we impose different
types of limitations.
Our first example is the Maximin rule with a natural im-
provement dynamic, termed Upgrade, where the deviator
moves a new winner to a higher position, keeping the rel-
ative ranking of the remaining candidates unchanged. As we
will show, when the requirement of BU-1 and BU-2 regard-
ing the current winner is removed, restricting the voters to
not upgrade any candidate other than the new winner, is nec-
essary for convergence.
We then move to a subclass of integer PSRs, termed unit
gap scoring rules, where the difference in any two consec-
utive scores sj , sj+1 is bounded by 1 (this class contains
all common PSRs such as Plurality, Veto, k-approval and
Borda). We show that FM and SM hold under the iterative
process, called Unit Upgrade, where a new winner is moved
by exactly one position higher in the ballot of the deviator.
Importantly, without imposing the restriction of fixing the
position of the current winner, this property is implied by
the Unit Upgrade policy.
Finally, we demonstrate that the Unit Upgrade dynamics
converges for the Bucklin rule, satisfying the set monotonic-
ity condition. This is a particularly interesting result, as it
shows the first iterative process that converges for Bucklin
(after the SC dynamics that trivially converges for all rules).
Maximin with Upgrade
Consider the following policy for improvement moves:
• Upgrade (U): at each step, the deviator moves his
favourite alternative among those who can win the elec-
tion, to a higher (but not necessarily top) position in his
vote, and keeps the relative ranking of other candidates
unchanged. The upgraded candidate is the new winner.
Theorem 5. The iterative procedure (Maximin, U) satisfies
FM and both SM(a) and SM(b).
We first demonstrate the following useful property.
Lemma 1. Let (b0 → b1 → · · · ) be an improvement path
under Maximin. For each candidate c ∈ C, let TOc(bk) be
the set of his toughest opponents—i.e., candidates against
which c has minimal support in all pairwise comparisons:
TOc(b
k) = arg min
x∈C\{c}
nk(c, x)
where nk(c, x) is the number of voters that declare to prefer
c over x in profile bk. For any k ≥ 1, if sk(c) > sk−1(c)
then TOc(bk−1) ⊆ TOc(bk).
Proof. Since minx∈C\{c} nk(c, x) = sk(c) > sk−1(c) =
minx∈C\{c} nk−1(c, x), at step k the deviating voter awards
candidate c an additional point against each of his tough-
est opponents at step k − 1 (by moving c from under x ∈
TOc(b
k−1), above them). Thus, all of them must remain
his toughest opponents at step k.
Proof of Theorem 5. Assume on the contrary that FM or SM
does not hold. Let t ≥ 1 be the first step on the upgrade
path (b0 → b1 → · · · ) where monotonicity breaks—that
is, G(bk) ≥ G(bk−1) and PWi(bk) ⊆ PWi(bk−1), for
every 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 1, i ∈ V .
Case 1: Assume first that G(bt) < G(bt−1). This is only
possible if the Maximin score of the winner at step t− 1 de-
creases at step t: st(wt−1) < st−1(wt−1). If this was not the
case, then by the definition of G, wt−1 should have at least
the same score and a lower index than wt, a contradiction.
By the Upgrade policy, this means that the deviator at step
t (say, voter i) moves wt from under wt−1, above wt−1 in
his ballot. Since i prefers wt to wt−1, there was a step k < t
at which voter i made wt−1 a winner. This is due to the Up-
grade policy, the fact that the process starts from the truthful
state, and that wt−1 was ranked higher than wt at bt−1i . That
is, wt−1 was the most preferable candidate among potential
winners of i at bk−1, and hence wt−1 ∈ PWi(bk−1) but
wt /∈ PWi(bk−1). However, wt ∈ PWi(bt−1), in contra-
diction to the set monotonicity until step t− 1.
Case 2: Suppose now that G(bt) ≥ G(bt−1), but
PWi(b
t) 6⊆ PWi(bt−1) for some i ∈ V . Let c ∈ C
and i ∈ V such that c ∈ PWi(bt) \ PWi(bt−1). First
assume that the set of c’s toughest opponents decreased at
step t: TOc(bt−1) 6⊆ TOc(bt), so there is a candidate
c′ ∈ TOc(bt−1) with c′ 6∈ TOc(bt). By Lemma 1, we have
st(c) ≤ st−1(c). In fact, equality is not possible. To see
this, note that c is not the winner at bt, otherwise c would
belong to PWi(bt−1), by the definition of PWi(·). Hence
c does not receive any additional points from the deviating
voter at step t. But then, the only way that candidate c′ can
stop being one of the toughest opponents of c at bt, is if
some other tough opponent is moved by the deviator from
beneath c, to a position above c, implying that the Maximin
score of c decreases by 1: st(c) = st−1(c) − 1. Now, since
G(bt) ≥ G(bt−1), and hence, st(wt) ≥ st−1(wt−1) (with
equality only if wt beats wt−1 in tie-breaking), we have
st(c) ≤ st(wt) − 1. We claim then that c cannot belong to
the set of potential winners of any voter at bt. This is based
on similar arguments as in Case 1, showing that otherwise
monotonicity would be violated at an earlier stage. Hence,
we reach a contradiction to the fact that c ∈ PWi(bt).
Thereby, we have established that TOc(bt−1) ⊆ TOc(bt).
Since c ∈ PWi(bt), and c is not the winner at step t,
voter i can increase the score of c—that is, in his ballot all
the toughest opponents of c are ranked above c. Since c /∈
PWi(b
t−1), this was not the case at bt−1. It is easy to see
then that one of the toughest opponents of c at step t − 1
was ranked below c in voter i’s ballot. Since TOc(bt−1) ⊆
TOc(b
t), this candidate was moved above c at bt, and the
score of c decreased by 1. But this excludes c from the set of
potential winners for all the voters, again a contradiction.
Finally, we show that both SM(a) and SM(b) hold. For
SM(b), we trivially have q ≤ m − 1. For SM(a), note that
at the first step, all the voters who cannot make the truth-
ful winner, w0, win again (i.e., those who rank w0 above
at least one of his toughest opponents—certainly, there is at
least one such vote), lose w0 from their set of potential win-
ners. Similarly, at each step k, the voter who deviated at the
previous step, loses the previous winner, wk−1, from his set
of potential winners. Hence, SM(a) holds.
Next, we argue that the requirement of upgrading (i.e.,
moving up) only the winning candidate is necessary for
convergence under many rules, when the absolute position
of the current winner can change in the ballot. For in-
stance, cycles have been shown for Copeland (Grandi et al.
2013), k-approval and Borda (Lev and Rosenschein 2012;
Reyhani and Wilson 2012), even when lexicographic tie-
breaking is used. For Maximin, (Lev and Rosenschein 2012)
provide a cycling example with deterministic, but not lexico-
graphic, tie-breaking. We strengthen this negative result, by
giving an example where ties are broken lexicographically.
Example 3. There are 2 voters {1, 2} and 4 candidates
{a, b, c, d}, with d  b  c  a for tie-breaking. At first
step, the agents vote sincerely, seen below, and d wins. As
voter 1 prefers b over d, he deviates from his true preference
order abdc and votes abcd, which makes b win (note that
this is a best response for voter 1, and it involves moving a
non-winning candidate). Next, voter 2 deviates to make c a
winner, and so on. We describe the improvement path below,
with a cycle starting at the fourth step:
(abdc, cdba){d} 1→ (abcd, cdba){b} 2→ (abcd, cadb){c}
1→ (bcda, cadb){b} 2→ (bcda, adcb){d}
↑1 ↓1
(abdc, cadb){c} 2← (abdc, adcb){a}
Unit gap scoring rules with Unit Upgrade
Let F be a PSR with an integer scoring vector (s1, ..., sm).
We say that F is a unit gap scoring rule if sj − sj+1 ≤ 1
for any j = 1, . . . ,m − 1. This includes the most common
PSRs, such as, Plurality, Veto, k-approval and Borda.
For such rules, we further restrict the Upgrade policy:
• Unit Upgrade (UU): at each step, the deviator moves his
favourite alternative among the potential winners, by ex-
actly one position up, and keeps the relative ranking of the
others unchanged. The upgraded alternative wins.
Theorem 6. Let F be a unit gap scoring rule. Then, the
iterative procedure (F , UU) is both function monotone and
set monotone—specifically, it satisfies SM(b).
We note that both reducing the class of PSRs to the unit gap
rules and the further restriction of the Upgrade policy to al-
low only unit upgrades are necessary for each of the mono-
tonicity conditions to hold. E.g., for (Borda, U), both FM
and SM may not hold. The example can be further modified
to show that FM and SM can be violated under positional
scoring rules with non-unit gap scores, even if the agents
apply only unit upgrades.
The Bucklin rule with Unit Upgrade
Finally, as Example 1 may also suggest, we show that UU
converges for Bucklin.
Theorem 7. The iterative procedure (Bucklin, UU) is set
monotone—in particular it satisfies SM(b).
Theorem 7 demonstrates the power of our technique,
which allowed us to prove convergence of the Bucklin rule
for the first time. To our knowledge, there was no known
reasonable iterative process converging under Bucklin, ex-
cept the very restrictive SC dynamics that trivially termi-
nates for all voting rules. Indeed, neither BU, nor its relaxed
versions BU-1/BU-2 converge for Bucklin, as fixing the po-
sition of the current winner in the ballot of the deviator does
not guarantee that his score also remains unchanged. How-
ever, our results still leave open the question of maximal-
ity of the UU dynamics (both under Bucklin and PSRs). In-
deed, we observe that monotonicity breaks if we relax the
UU restriction—that is, allow the voters to move a new win-
ner higher by more than one position. However, this does not
yet imply that a similar dynamics with larger allowed up-
grades would not converge (our monotonicity conditions are
only sufficient conditions for convergence). Hence it would
be interesting to determine how far this policy could be mod-
erated.
Conclusions
We provided a framework for studying convergence proper-
ties of iterative voting procedures under restricted dynamics.
We established two general sufficient conditions that guar-
antee convergence of such myopic improvements. We then
identified several classes of voting rules, along with their
corresponding iterative processes, for which at least one of
these conditions hold. Our work puts under the same frame-
work recent results, it generalises some of them by relaxing
their assumptions, and also provides further positive results
for more families of rules and dynamics.
Besides gaining a better understanding of what makes an
iterative voting procedure converge, it is also important to
evaluate the quality of outcomes obtained by such proce-
dures. For example, under some instances, voting dynamics
may converge to a profile, where voters may still wish to
change their vote, but are not allowed to do so due to the pol-
icy restriction. Therefore, we need to understand which of
the restricted iterative processes can guarantee convergence
to a Nash equilibrium, and under what conditions. Analysing
the Dynamic Price of Anarchy and analogous measures for
the quality of outcomes of iterative procedures, along the
lines of (Branzei et al. 2013), would also be equally inter-
esting and have an impact on the use of original motivating
applications.
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